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ESSAY

The Anfal Genocide:
Personal
Reflections and Legal ResidueMichael A. Newton**
I was humbled to be asked to share some of my perspectives on
the Anfal Genocide against the Kurdish people with you tonight. I
am honored to be here and able to share in this series of events that
in the aggregate form the 30th Annual Holocaust Memorial Lecture
Series. As many of you know, the annual Vanderbilt University series
is the oldest of its kind on a college campus. The thematic thread
running throughout the series is that human suffering and genocidal
frenzy has been a constant component of our "modern" world. This
series is dedicated to commemorating the lessons to be drawn from
past suffering and to confronting current realities that threaten the
lives and safety of people in conflict zones around the world. The
strong support for this lecture series, as well as your attendance
tonight, reflects an admirable seriousness and a commitment to
academic discourse that befits a great university. These are serious
topics for a serious time, and it is a rare and genuine pleasure to be
with you to share a few comments on the suffering of the Kurdish
people.
It is particularly gratifying to see such a strong
representation by the local Kurdish community in attendance.

* This is an edited transcript of an address delivered at Vanderbilt University Law
School on October 17, 2007 by Professor Michael A. Newton to members of the
community, staff, and faculty, and many assembled students.
The lecture was
delivered as part of the 30th Annual Vanderbilt University Holocaust Lecture Series,
see Calendar for Broken Silence: 30th Annual Vanderbilt University Holocaust Lecture
Series, http://www.vanderbilt.edu/religiouslife/holocaustlectures.html (last visited Nov.
16, 2007).
The theme for the Thirtieth Annual Holocaust Lecture Series-Broken
Silence-reaffirms Vanderbilt's long-standing commitment to expand the frontiers of
our conversation about the Holocaust and other genocides by providing a stage for new
perspectives and new questions, and for conveying those narratives that have struggled
to find a voice or an audience.
** Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. For more
information on Professor Newton, see http://law.vanderbilt.edu/newton.
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As a preface, and in the interests of full disclosure, you should
understand that I have spent much time with Kurdish lawyers and
leaders. I was actively involved in the preparations for this trial and
also advised the Iraqi High Criminal Court on aspects of
international law associated with the complex legal issues presented
by the Anfal facts. My interactions with the Kurdish people began in
the mountains of northern Iraq in April 1991 as they fled the
persecution of the regime in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf
War. In my continuing interactions with the Kurdish community, I
have often sensed the ethos of the suffering of the people, and over
time I grew to admire their will to survive and thrive. At the same
time, there was a quiet fortitude and resolute sense of community
and family that has provided an admirable example of enduring
strength of human spirit in the face of adversity and almost
unspeakable suffering. The Kurds possess what one writer described
as Kurdi zin duah, meaning a fierce warrior spirit wrapped in a love
of homeland, tradition, respect and love of family, and an abiding
respect for ancestors and village spirits.' I also felt the quiet and
intense need for justice as the only appropriate response to what
happened to the Kurds during the 1988 Anfal campaigns.
There is a very deep and almost palpable sense in which justice
feeds the soul of the Kurdish people. For the Greek philosophers, the
pursuit of justice was the highest calling of human endeavor. 2 Many
Kurds dedicated their lives to pursuing peace and justice in the
aftermath of the Anfal campaigns of 1988. In my work with Iraqi
judges and lawyers, I have grown to respect their sincerity and sheer
physical courage. For nearly seven years now, I have been privileged
to work extensively with Iraqi judges and lawyers, and I was involved
in the preparations for the Anfal genocide trial. I can assure you that
the Iraqi jurists felt the weight of their duty on behalf of the people
and on behalf of the law itself. I salute your efforts in being here
tonight to reach across cultures and chasms of experience to perhaps
absorb some the lessons that come from the Kurdish experience.
I hope to leave you with some tangible sense of the legal
importance of the Anfal genocide trial that has recently concluded in
Baghdad, as well as some of my observations of key legal concepts
that the trial marks. The series of eight military campaigns
conducted from February to August 1988 together constitute one of
the most concerted and tragic series of events in the history of human

1.
(2004).
2.

See MIKE TUCKER, HELL IS OVER: VOICES OF KURDS AFTER SADDAM xiii
BRIAN R. NELSON, WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT: FROM SOCRATES TO THE

AGE OF IDEOLOGY 31 (1982) (describing Plato's idealized conception of societal order in
which the appropriate order of virtues is maintained. Justice is the "virtue of virtues"
in the sense that it permits the maintenance of a "proper relationship between wisdom,
courage, and temperance.").
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affairs. These campaigns began close to the Iranian border, but
eventually stretched far across a swath of Iraqi territory and to the
border between Iraq and Turkey. The Anfal campaign stands as a
monument to the level of savagery that eats at the very heart of what
polite people call civilization. Civilized people want what is good for
each other. The defendants brought before the bar of justice in
Baghdad3 conducted a deliberate, systematized, and orchestrated
series of campaigns intended to eradicate every trace of Kurdish
civilization and culture across a broad swath of Northern Iraq. They
acted with a calculated cruelty and deliberateness of purpose because
they felt secure in the belief that they were more important than the
law. They embody the essence of impunity because their actions
betrayed the belief that Saddam's power would forever shield them
from any accountability. Juxtaposed against the ongoing work of the
ad hoc tribunals established by the United Nations Security Council, 4

3.
The Anfal trial began in Baghdad on August 21, 2006. When the trial
began, Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti, former President of Iraq, was one of the named
defendants. His execution at the hands of Iraqi officials following conviction in the alDujail trial meant that the Anfal trial received far less attention outside the region.
One defendant, Taher Tawfiq Tafiq AI-Ani, was acquitted by Trial Chamber II even
though he was the Head of the Northern Affairs Committee and served as the
Governor of Mosul. At the time of this writing, the defendants currently awaiting final
resolution of their cases are as follows: Ali-Hassan A1-Majid Al-Tikriti (Majid is known
around the world as Chemical Ali for his role in the use of chemical weapons against
Kurdish villages. He exercised superior responsibility over each and every attack
conducted against each and every one of the Kurdish villages throughout the eight
Anfal campaigns.); Sultan Hashim Ahmad Al-Jabbouri Al-Tai (Jabbouri served as the
Commander of Task Force Anfal from February 1988 to April 1, 1988, when he was
made commander of the 1st Corps in Suleimaneyah. This defendant was a career
military officer, serving forty-one years in the Iraqi Regular Army, reaching the rank of
General and eventually Minister of Defense in 1995.); Farhan Mutlak Salih A1-Jiburi
(Jiburi served as the head of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (Istikhbarat) Eastern
Regional office and prepared and forwarded a series of memorandums to his superiors
regarding villages that had been "eliminated," which establishes his knowledge of the
overall plan and its goals. In addition, every detainee or civilian deportee during Anfal
would have gone through the control of this defendant's Istikhbarat office in Kirkuk for
processing. Therefore, this defendant had first-hand knowledge of the number of
civilians forced from their villages during Anfal, as well as the treatment they
received.); Husayn Rashid Muhammed (Muhammed served as Deputy of Operations of
the Iraqi Armed Forces, and attended many meetings related to the planning and
coordination of military operations throughout the Anfal campaigns. Units under his
direct authority were involved in sweeps of the Rubar-I Qashan Valley villages and
forced relocation of Kurdish residents.); Sabir Abd Al-Aziz Husayn Al-Duri (Director of
the Istikhbarat). See Judge Munqadh Al Far'un, Chief Public Prosecutor, Prosecutorial
Closing Argument in the Anfal Case, at 5-7, http://www.iraq-iht.org/en/doc/ppb.pdf
(last visited Dec. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Anfal Closing Argument]; see also Michael A.
Newton, Inside Look at The Anfal Trial, NASHvILLE B.J., Sept. 2006, at 8-9, 17-18.
4.
See generally Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, adopted by S.C. Res. 827, UN Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing
the criminal tribunal for atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia); Statute of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing same for Rwanda).
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the first trials in the permanent International Criminal Court, the
proliferation of internationalized/hybrid domestic mechanisms, and
the increasing use of domestic forums to prosecute the most serious
crimes of concern to the international community, the Anfal trial
represents irrefutable evidence that the era of accountability is
irreversibly underway.
The State of Iraq, whose very existence should have served as
the primary protection for all Iraqis, instead became the engine of evil
that sought to harm and kill the Kurdish people as a group. 5 By
unanimously adopting Resolution 96(1) in 1946, the United Nations
General Assembly defined genocide as "a denial of the right of
existence of entire human groups."6 In other words, the intentional
destruction of people based on the stable and objective characteristics
that make them part of an identifiable group undermines their very
right to exist and therefore erodes the essence of their very
humanity. 7 This premise became the foundation upon which the
modern meaning of the term "genocide" and the scope of the
expanding jurisprudence was built. That, ladies and gentlemen, is
the heart of the genocide charges-the Ba'ath party leadership sought
to eliminate the Kurdish people from northern Iraq based on their
ethnic identity.
The Iraqi effort to incorporate the law of genocide into its
domestic legal fabric is well in line with modern trends around the
world. The modern field termed "international criminal law" is an
interrelated system in which domestic forums, such as those
established by the Iraqis, are responsible for implementing
international norms alongside the institutions established by the
international community. In essence, Iraqi officials harmonized the
Iraqi criminal code with international law to the same extent as those
officials in other nations who are enacting implementing legislation
after accession or ratification of the Rome Statute of the International
8
Criminal Court.

5.
Thomas Aquinas wrote that the first principle of natural law is do good and
to avoid evil. According to Aquinas, the very purpose of government is to foster "the
unity and peace of the people." PAUL CHRISTOPHER, THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE:
AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL AND MORAL ISSUES 77 (1994).
6.
G.A. Res. 96 (1), at 188-89, U.N. Doc. AI64/Add. 1 (Dec. 11, 1946).
President Reagan commented that "nations of the world came together and drafted the
Genocide Convention as a howl of anguish and an effort to prevent and punish future
acts of genocide." Pres. Ronald Reagan, Genocide Convention Implementation Act of
1987, 89 DEP'T OF ST. BULL. 38, 38 (Jan. 1, 1989).
7.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10, Judgment,
69
(Dec. 14, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/jelisictrialc1/judgement/index.htm
(noting that the protection extends to and is limited to groups defined by "stable"
characteristics).

8.
For a summary of state practice implementing the provisions comparable
criminal provisions in the Rome Statute, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS, AND
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Today, the force of genocide law is becoming nearly ubiquitous
and increasingly uniform.
The world today shares a common
framework of definitions and principles that have been applied in a
growing body of jurisprudence. On that basis alone, the Anfal
genocide case is an important trial because it represents the latest
and most notable benchmark in the jurisprudential pathway. As the
prosecutor said in his closing argument,
Your honorable court represents the voice of the Iraqi civilization,
which says to the world that the law in Iraq will not permit these
crimes to go unpunished. These are the crimes of genocide, the crimes
against humanity, and the war crimes which were committed against
the innocent people of Kurdistan.
These crimes were widespread and brutal to the point that they have
gone beyond the borders of our country[] and have been imposed upon
the conscience of humankind throughout the world.
The Anfal shows to the world that the defendants are former officials
who abandoned the most important duty of government, which is to
9
protect and ensure the precious lives of its people.

The textbook definition of genocide flows from the 1948 Genocide
Convention, and has been revalidated in every one of the
international tribunal statutes. The Iraqi High Criminal Court
statute, as it was originally drafted and then re-promulgated by
sovereign Iraqi officials in October 2005, replicates the wellestablished law of genocide. 10
For those unfamiliar with its legal
content, the accepted definitions are clear: Ix
"genocide" means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such:
(a)

Killing members of the group;

(b)

Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c)
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d)
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e)

Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group

INTEGRATED TEXT, Vol I, 188-91 (2005). See also Michael A. Newton, Comparative
Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute of the
InternationalCriminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20 (Mar. 2001).
9.
Anfal Closing Argument, supra note 3, at 4.
10.
Compare Al-Waqa'i Al-Ivaqiya [The Official Gazette of the Republic of
Iraq], Law of the The Iraqi Higher Criminal Court, Oct. 18, 2005, 4006 No. 10, arts. 11,
12, 13,
available at http://www.law.case.edulgrotian-moment.blog/documents/
ISTstatuteofficial-english.pdf [hereinafter Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court]
with Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 6-8, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
11.
Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court, supra note 9, art. 11. The Iraqi
Statute mirrors the other substantive categories for individual accountability by also
criminalizing conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit
genocide, attempts to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide.
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Martin Luther King believed that the force of God expressed in
society is justice. 12 If I may be so presumptuous as to add an
addendum, call it Newton's Corollary if you like, I believe that the
force of God expressed personally results in passion. The purest and
finest offerings of the human spirit come from the deeply held
principles that motivate us and lead us through enormous pain to
emerge triumphant and whole. The extent of the Kurdish genocide
was preserved for history by many brave people who had the passion
to document the suffering of their people. They smuggled out
photographs, took witness statements, preserved evidence, and swore
to work for justice so long as they had free will and the breath to
power their efforts. In documenting the crimes committed against
the Kurdish people, the survivors displayed the same fierce resilience
that is one of the defining characteristics of Kurdish culture. They
risked their lives in the hopes that they could provide the
ammunition for the pursuit of justice long in the future. The daily
testimony unfolding in Baghdad represented their vindication.
The quintessence for the modern conception of genocide law is
the preservation of the existence of every distinctive society and
culture across the globe. While the modern treaty regime and its
judicial implementation does not extend quite as far as Raphael
Lemkin originally conceived, 13 the law of genocide is designed around
the central goal of preventing the physical destruction of human
groups defined in terms of stable and fixed characteristics rather
That
than the vast range of mutable or transient identifiers.
explains why the modern law of genocide requires that the targeted
group be defined only by its positive characteristics as opposed to
14
negative reasons such as "non-Serb" or, in this case, "anti-Iraqi.'
The Kurdish people are people. That is not a profound sentiment.
Let me explain. The people who lived in the region of the Northern
Bureau in 1988 were just like you and I- they had hopes, they had

See ALEX AYRES, THE WISDOM OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: AN A-TO-Z
12.
GUIDE TO THE IDEAS AND IDEALS OF THE GREAT CIVIL RIGHTS LEADER 125 (1993). The

author explains:
For King justice was the critical issue of earthly life. Justice was more than a
legal issue; it was more than a moral issue; it was a spiritual issue. The
realization of justice was the realization of God's presence on earth. "The Lord
God is a god of justice," he asserted.
Id.
13.

JOHN

QUIGLEY, THE GENOCIDE

CONVENTION: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW

ANALYSIS 5 (2006) (quoting Lemkin's opinions that genocide ought properly to be
envisioned as the destruction of any aspects of political, social, cultural and physical
existence of a targeted group).
14.
See Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
196 (Int'l Ct. Justice Feb. 26, 2007), reprinted in 46 I.L.M.
Montenegro), Judgment,
185 (2007), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf.
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dreams; they had struggles, they had sibling rivalries. They had
some friends and some enemies; they had some virtues and some vice.
The Kurdish people confronted the same range of problems that face
all peoples across the planet. The law of genocide says unequivocally
that they were entitled to confront their daily human challenges. In
the aggregate as a group that shares common links, customs, and
practices, the right of individual Kurds to exist as an inalienable
human right is extrapolated into the larger right protected by the
prohibition against genocide for the identity of the group to which
they belong. They did have an inalienable and undeniable right to
exist. This is the most fundamental right for both individual persons
and for the composite groups they form.
The Kurds of the Northern Bureau were human beings with all
of their foibles and folly, and all human beings can relate to them on
a variety of levels regardless of race, tribe, ethnicity, religion, or
region. Their lives were centered on family and faith and on their
hopes for the future. Rather than acknowledging their individuality
and their fundamental human right to exist in peace and dignity, the
Iraqi officials simply labeled all Kurds in Northern Iraq as "Iranian
saboteurs" and "agents of the enemy."
I cannot hope to adequately convey the scope of suffering or the
array of experiences suffered during the Anfal campaigns. While the
Anfal trial was televised, the Arabic nature of the proceedings
obscured its import, and the decisions of the Trial and Cassation
Panels are not publicly available at the time of this writing. The
investigative judge's report containing the Anfal documents and
testimony was 9,312 pages long, and the year-long trial produced a
trial opinion that runs to some 963 pages. 1 5 Thousands of victims
who could have come to the trial chamber to swear on the Koran to
tell the truth about their suffering are instead buried in the mass
graves scattered across Iraq. The facts are plain, yet they defy logic.
The numbers can only hint at the enormity of the experience. When
the Anfal trial began in Baghdad on August 21, 2006, the Iraqis had
prepared a huge map of the Northern Bureau. It was covered with a
sea of pins to illustrate the villages destroyed by the Iraqi
government. Although the map was large enough to occupy the entire
corner of the large room, it looked small from the distant television
camera high overhead. Each pin stood as mute testimony the people
whose lives were shattered by the concerted power of the Iraqi state.
Some of the victims who were lucky enough to survive testified
firsthand of what they saw and heard and felt. For example, one man
told of being taken to a mass grave along with thirty-one other Kurds.
Thirty Iraqi soldiers fired three full magazines each into the group of
prisoners. The witness somehow survived. He described what

15.

See Newton, Inside Look at The Anfal Trial, supra note 3, at 8.
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happened to him and gave them the bullet that doctors removed from
his leg to the investigator. 16 He knows what Anfal did to the Kurdish
people. The cruelty of the regime stripped its Kurdish victims of
almost every possible possession. They lost their lives, they lost their
property, they lost their families, and they lost their dreams.
Each pin on the map represented a village-a way of life in
microcosm-an interconnected pattern of days and generations and
struggles to survive. The facts can be stated with clinical precision.
Thousands of Kurdish civilians killed (some estimates range as high
as 200,000); thousands more disappeared; families were separated
and imprisoned for no other reason than that they were Kurds living
in Northern Iraq; there were more than fifty documented attacks
conducted by chemical weapons against defenseless civilian families.
Village after village was emptied of its inhabitants. Villages were
burned and bombed with artillery shells, bombs, and chemical
weapons. Many villages were then bulldozed to the ground as if the
17
destruction of the population was not enough.
The regime sought to eliminate even the physical vestiges of
Kurdish society by destroying the people, their homes, and their
businesses. There are aerial photos showing barren landscapes
where peaceful villages had been only days before the picture.
Village after village after village was destroyed. Day after day after
day was filled with death. Thousands of villages were destroyed
because of the policy aimed at reshaping the land to show no traces of
the social network or Kurdish culture that thrived in that location.
Not satisfied with destroying the physical vestiges of Kurdish
villages, regime forces also bombed water supplies, or in some
instances, blocked them so that Kurds who somehow survived and

16.
These are the author's recollections from the Anfal trial. See also Anfal
Closing Argument, supra note 3 (describing the plight of witnesses to the Anfal
atrocities).
17.
See Anfal Closing Argument, supra note 3, at 7, 8, 20-22. While using the
map as a demonstrative at trial, the prosecution recounted this precision of planning
and the scope of destruction:
Each red dot on [the map] refers to the location of an attack carried out
against a Kurdish village. [Sbo each red dot indicates a village that was
attacked by military troops, in many instances with the support of security
forces and the Military Intelligence Directorate.
There are a great many
witnesses, but these shown
officially documented by the
of villages destroyed reaches

more villages that were destroyed, according to
on the map are only the ones which been [sic]
regime. Estimates indicate that the total number
4,000.

The manner in which the Anfal campaign was carried out was similarly
horrifying in hundreds of villages: houses looted, burned and destroyed, then
entire village [sic] demolished with bulldozers and explosives.
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managed to return to the vicinity of their village could not even
rebuild.
In a return to the Middle Ages (before modern law developed),
Iraqi forces poisoned some water supplies in areas to prevent
returning Kurdish families from resuming normal life. Prosecutor
Munqith al-Faroon explained during his eloquent closing statement
that Ali Hassan al-Majid and four other defendants deserved the
harshest possible punishment because they did not have mercy on
elderly people or women or children-not even animals or plants or
the environment.' 8
In private conversations, he pointed out
poignantly that even the birds suffered during Anfal from the clouds
of chemical weapons that blew indiscriminately across the face of
northern Iraq.
Family after family was torn apart across the expanse of Iraqi
territory subject to the authority of the Northern Bureau. There are
accounts that only the caprice of a guard's whim led to the survival of
some Kurds, while others suffered in their place. Wives waited in
vain for their husbands to return. Parents waited with hope for the
return of their sons who had been taken off with by the Security
Forces or the military. One witness described being beaten and
tortured, then forced to watch his sister raped. Sons were sacrificed
to the plans that the government made and carried out during Anfal.
Widows grieved for their loved ones, then became themselves the
victims of the unrelenting cruelty towards Iraqi people. It took all of
the orchestrated power of the Iraqi state to carry out the sustained
level of planning and execution needed to commit the Anfal
campaigns. The government drove busloads of civilians away never
to be seen again-the Iraqi military and Security Forces carried out
relentless attacks on civilians, and there was no safe place across the
Kurdish Autonomous Province. These people were starved, raped,
tortured, and relocated because they were Kurds-but they suffered
and died as Iraqis.
You know of the infamy of names from the 20th Century
experience:
Dachau, Bergen-Belsen, Auschwitz, Celebici, and
Treblinka. The Kurds had their own places of suffering and torment
to add to the list: Topzawa prison; Dibs; Nugra Salma; the women's

18.

See Anfal Closing Argument, supra note 3, at 23.

Finally, the Office of the Public Prosecutor asks your honorable court to inflict
the cruelest and most extreme punishment upon the defendants ... , who did
their utmost to corrupt the land, and they destroyed the crops and the cattle,
and they had no mercy [on] a single old man, woman, or child. And even other
creations of Allah, such as animals, trees, and the natural environment were
not spared their brutality and tyranny.
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prison at Suleimaneyah; and the list goes on. The names themselves
provide stark testimony to the suffering of the Kurds.
An element of sheer luck often provided the razor edge between
life and death, hope and tragedy, prosperity or poverty for the
Kurdish families of the Northern Bureau. Their fate was often left to
the whims of regime officials or military officers. There is one
account of an argument between two Army officers over the proper
line for one young boy to be in. The kind Lieutenant won the
argument that day and the boy was left with his mother, while the
other boys were taken away and killed. The families of Sheik Wasan
and Balisan and hundreds of other villages had no one to protect
them from the power of the regime. The morning after the attacks on
the villages, Iraqi soldiers and pro-regime militias entered the
villages to loot the homes, and army engineers destroyed the homes
with explosives. Like so many other Kurdish villages, Sheik Wasan
and Balisan were both bulldozed to the ground after they were
attacked, and the people were either killed or fled, leaving nothing to
testify that barely twenty four hours earlier two entire villages of
Kurdish people had lived and worked in that spot. Somewhere
between two hundred and four hundred villagers died in this attack,
among them thirty-three children under the age of four, twenty-eight
children between the ages of five and fourteen, and many elderly
people.
Anfal survivors describe a primal fear and resourcefulness born
Even as they were rounded up for
of sheer desperation.
transportation to what many hoped would be safety, most Kurds
realized with a sick lump in their stomach that they were bound for a
much worse fate. The people lost everything except their identity and
heritage as Kurds.
If you can imagine with me what the experience of Anfal was like
for so many families, not markedly different perhaps from your
family. Iraqi officials come early in the morning. Your village is
surrounded. As a father, you would gladly lay down your life to
protect your family, but you never get the chance as you are taken to
a collection area and then trucked to an area where other men are
gathered. The fathers told their young sons to be brave and to take
care of their mothers. Mothers cried and tried to think clearly while
Children knew that something big was
they panicked inside.
happening, but could not fathom the reality. The fathers later died
without even knowing where their families had been taken. The
mothers are told that they have half an hour to prepare to leave. You
pack some small food items; you take your identification; you grab
your medicines and perhaps a few precious but small items. You tell
your children that they can take one small item. Parents tried to be
brave and cheerful, even as their hearts ached at the fate awaiting
their children. As they left their homes and their gardens and their
worldly possessions, parents urged their children to take their most
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precious possession. They wanted them to take a reminder of homea tangible symbol that their lives could be normal again. One such
child who will remain nameless for the rest of history was found in
the mass grave at A-Hatra clutching a small ball and lying next to
his mother's decaying body.
The theme of this series is "Broken Silence." In a sense, that is
ironic to me, because in the chaos of the mass graves and the ouster
of Kurdish families from their homes and way of life, the silence of
early morning was shattered in so many villages by shouts and
shooting and chaos. It was a scene of confusion as a way of life was
literally torn apart. The attempted destruction of a protected group
in whole or in part is the core of what the law seeks to protect. Even
a glance at the map shows that the destruction was widespread and
systematic-in other words, it is the paradigmatic instance of what
might be termed ethnic cleansing. In the language of the law, this
was a crime against humanity because it was conducted pursuant to
and in furtherance of the express goals of the Ba'ath Party leadership
in the Northern Bureau under the command of Ali Hassan al-Majid.
Given the established baseline of criminality, one might reasonably
ask, "Why pursue the time and expense of proving the more rigorous
constituent elements needed to establish the crime of genocide?"
After all, many would argue that judicial efficiency and the
overarching need to prosecute as many former Ba'ath Party officials
as possible mitigates towards a policy of pragmatic prosecution.
Distant observers might ask, "Isn't it sufficient to do justice with
convictions and confessions, and the occasional apology?" One of the
culpable defendants in the Anfal genocide trial was spared the death
penalty presumably because of his sincere apology-isn't that alone a
worthwhile contribution to national reconciliation?
In fact, such an approach would have negated the real value of
categorizing what happened to the Kurdish people by its rightful
legal category: genocide. One of the subtle contributions of the
recently concluded Anfal genocide trial has been to refocus analysis
9 of genocide. The
on the criteria for establishing the dolus specialis"
international tribunals have been consistent in holding that evidence
of genocidal intent can be inferred from the constellation of facts,
circumstances, and statements surrounding a complex pattern of
genocide. 20
Specifically, relevant facts and circumstances could

19.
The legal term of art dolus specialis refers to the mental element of specific
intent which is the defining legal principle embedded in the genocide jurisprudence.
The specific intent to destroy the victim group in whole or in part applies to all of the
material acts constituting genocide, and refers to the degree rather than the scope of
the perpetrator's intent. See Payam Akhavan, The Crime of Genocide in the ICTR
Jurisprudence,3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 989, 992 (2005).
20.
See, e.g., Rutaganda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 96-3-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgement, 525 (May 26, 2003) (concurring with the Trial chamber citation
to the KayishemalRuzindanaAppeals Judgement 160 for the principle that making
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include "the general context, the perpetration of other culpable acts
systematically directed against the same group, the scale of atrocities
committed, the systematic targeting of victims on account of their
membership of a particular group, or the repetition of destructive and

anti-Tutsi utterances or being affiliated to an extremist anti-Tutsi group is not a sine
qua non for establishing dolus specialis, but that "establishing such a fact may,
nonetheless, facilitate proof of specific intent"). In its opinion, the Trial Chamber wrote
as follows:
398. In its findings on the applicable law with respect to the crime of genocide,
the Chamber held that, in practice, intent may be determined, on a case by case
basis, through a logical inference from the material evidence submitted to it,
and which establish a consistent pattern of conduct on the part of the Accused.
Quoting a text from the findings in the Akayesu Judgement, it holds:
"On the issue of determining the offender's specific intent, the Chamber
considers that the intent is a mental factor which is difficult, even
impossible, to determine. This is the reason why, in the absence of a
confession from the Accused, his intent can be inferred from a certain
number of presumptions of fact. The Chanber considers that it is
possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a particular act
charged from the general context of the perpetration of other culpable
acts systematically directed against that same group, whether these acts
were committed by the same offender or by others. Other factors, such as
the scale of atrocities committed, their general nature, in a region or a
country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and systematically
targeting victims on account of their membership of a particular group,
while excluding the members of other groups, can enable the Chamber
to infer the genocidal intent of a particular act."
399. The Chamber notes that many corroborating testimonies presented at trial
show that the Accused actively participated in the widespread attacks and
killings committed against the Tutsi group. The Chamber is satisfied that the
Accused, who held a position of authority because of his social standing, the
reputation of his father and, above all, his position within the Interahamwe,
ordered and abetted in the commission of crimes against members of the Tutsi
group. He also directly participated in committing crimes against Tutsis. The
victims were systematically selected because they belonged to the Tutsi group
and for the very fact that they belonged to the said group. As a result, the
Chamber is satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt that, at the time of
commission of all the above-mentioned acts which in its opinion are proven, the
Accused had indeed the intent to destroy the Tutsi group as such.
400. Moreover, on the basis of evidence proffered at trial and discussed in this
Judgement under the section on the general allegations, the Chamber finds
that, at the time of the events referred to in the Indictment, numerous
atrocities were committed against Tutsis in Rwanda. From the widespread
nature of such atrocities, throughout the Rwandan territory, and the fact that
the victims were systematically and deliberately selected owing to their being
members of the Tutsi group, to the exclusion of individuals who were not
members of the said group, the Chamber is able to infer a general context
within which acts aimed at destroying the Tutsi group were perpetrated.
Consequently, the Chamber notes that such acts as are charged against the
Accused were part of an overall context.
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3-T, Judgment, T 398-400 (Dec. 6,
1999).
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discriminatory acts. '2 1 Furthermore, the Iraqi Trial Chamber would
not be breaking new jurisprudential ground by finding that Ba'ath
Party officials could be held accountable for genocidal acts based on a
theory of superior responsibility where they exercised effective control
over the organizations and persons actually conducting the genocidal
22
acts.
Here is where I find the theme of this lecture series, "Broken
Silence," to be betrayed by the evidence on the ground. It is true that
the mass graves became silent after the government forces moved
away, and the bodies began to suponify. However, the voices of
victims figuratively echoed in the stories of relatives. The Kurdish
national identity was shaped by the addition of a new verbAnfalized. In a stark irony, the mass graves themselves spoke with
thundering clarity as the trial proceeded.
United States Army
officers from the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division reported that
as they approached the mass grave at Hatra, they could immediately
see that something was terribly wrong. 23 The earth itself testified to
the Anfal tragedy because the mass grave covered by a barren circle
of earth with no grass, flowers, or any other vegetation over the site.
Even if local Kurds had not informed the American soldiers where to
find the mass graves, the terrain was a visual indicator that this was
where the remains of an estimated ten thousand Kurds could be
24
found.
The determination of the dolus specialis necessary to support the
genocide convictions was buttressed by the clarity of the forensic
evidence that "spoke" to the acts of the defendants. The tendency of
the mass grave evidence to indicate genocidal intent was thundering
to trial observers and the bench itself as it deliberated. One factor
indicating genocide was the uniformity of clothing (i.e., Kurdish
dress). Another was the uniformity of the victims by region and

21.
See Prosecutor v Goran Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeals Judgement,
47 (July 5, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/jelisic/appeal/judgement/
index.htm. Paragraphs 53-77 of the Appeals Judgement consist of a lengthy recitation
of the facts adduced at trial, followed by the finding that the Trial Chamber erred in
failing to infer the dolus specialis from the evidence, although the appeals chamber
declined to order a retrial on grounds of judicial economy. See id.
53-77.
22.
See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52T, Judgement,
976 (Dec. 3, 2003) (imposing responsibility on Rwandan political
leaders because "to the extent that members of a political party act in accordance with
the dictates of the party, or otherwise under its instruction, those issuing such dictates
or instructions can and should be held accountable for their implementation").
23.
TUCKER, supra note 1, at 93 (documenting the first impressions of
Lieutenant Colonel Randal Kendall as he helped to supervise the early forensics work
in only one of the six known mass graves at Hatra). It is worth remembering as a
matter of historical record that the 101st Airborne division also had a leading role in
entering and liberating the camps in Nazi Germany in the latter days of the struggle to
overthrow Hitler's regime.
24.

Id. at 95.
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ethnic identity (i.e., Kurds from Northern Iraq). In fact, the evidence
from mass graves served to corroborate many of the details of the
planning and the implementation of the genocide that were attested
to in open court by live witnesses because victims from the same
villages would be found in the same graves having been transported
large distances. The consistency of the Kurdish artifacts and jewelry
also preserved the uniform ethnic identity of the victims; likewise
with the identification cards with cities destroyed during the
respective Anfal campaigns, and the occasional date on the medicine
bottle to definitively establish the temporal frame. The concrete
evidence from the mass graves spoke in chorus to corroborate the
evidence of the live witnesses and the available documentary
evidence. The mass graves themselves helped to break the silence of
the dead.
I am left with the conclusion that the Anfal campaigns were
genocide in its classic form. A sensible discussion of the role of the
bench in proving and punishing the genocide committed against the
Kurds must nevertheless proceed from a baseline understanding of
the origins and context for the development of genocide as a distinct
legal discipline. It is against that backdrop that the long-term legal
utility of the trial will be evaluated by the international community
and established in history. Before I close, I want to comment on two
important aspects of this trial that I believe will make the Anfal
genocide trial one of the hallmarks of modern genocide jurisprudence.
Raphael Lemkin's seminal work on genocide was published in
1944 and entitled Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation,
Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress. 2 5 Lemkin is today
remembered, as many of you no doubt know, as the progenitor of the
Genocide Convention and the originator of the neologism "genocide."
The distinct phrase genocide was first used in open court on
September 29, 1947, in the Einsatzgruppen trial by a young
American prosecutor named Benjamin Ferencz. 26 Ferencz used the
phrase in open court partially because it accurately captured the

25.
See RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE:
OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS

LAWS OF
(Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, 1944).
Video: Einsatzgruppen trial: U.S. prosecution condemns genocide (National
26.
http://www.ushmm.org/lcmedia/viewer/wlc/
at
available
1947),
Archives
film.php?Refld=DFP0668E. In his opening statement, Ferencz described the acts of
Nazi officials implementing party policies as being "the methodical execution of longrange plans to destroy ethnic, national, political, and religious groups which stood
condemned in the Nazi mind. Genocide, the extermination of whole categories of
human beings, was a foremost instrument of the Nazi doctrine." USA v. Otto
Ohlendorf et. al (Einsatzgruppen Case), 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 30-31 (1949).

For a description of this case and its opinion rendered on April 8, 1949, see MARJORIE
M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 907-910 (United States Department of

State 1968).
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essence of the criminal acts of those defendants, but also because
Lemkin was persistent and persuasive in advocating its incorporation
into the legal argument. As a passing note, Lemkin's subtitle
highlighted the right to redress for victims of genocide. One of the
most heated exchanges during the recently concluded Anfal trial
occurred when the judge informed defendants that their material
goods would be forfeited pursuant to the provision of the Iraqi
Tribunal Statute permitting the forfeiture of property or assets
27
derived directly or indirectly from the proceeds of a crime.
In Lemkin's classic analysis, he expressly observed that his
conception of genocide encompassed a broader set of goals than the
physical destruction of a group. In his view, genocide involved a
"coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of
essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of
annihilating the groups themselves." 28 He explained how genocide
consisted of two phases: first, acts aimed at the disintegration of the
political and social institutions of the victimized group, such as their
language, culture, national identity, religion, and economic
relationships; second, the destruction of the liberty, security, and
lives of the individual victims. 2 9 The attempted arabization of
Kurdish lands and language certainly fits this pattern. The Ba'ath
Party policy sought to destroy all aspects of Kurdish existencepolitical, social, biological, physical, religious, and moral. In his
summation of the scope of genocidal acts, the prosecutor included the
[d]estruction of the economy and infrastructure of rural Kurdistan,
similar to what was done in Nazi Germany. The defendants covered
their evil actions with euphemism. Whereas Nazi officials spoke of
"implementation procedures", "special movements", and "settlement in
the east", the defendants talked about "mass procedures", "returning to
'30
the national ranks", "modern villages", and "settlement in the south."

Although the legal scope of genocide as a crime is defined
exclusively as the acts seeking the physical destruction of a "national,
ethnical, racial, or religious group," its moral component endures as
the subtext of our condemnation of genocide. Lemkin's broader
definition of genocide, the one that extended beyond mass murder to
include political, social, religious, and moral measures to efface group
identity, embodied a broader normative concern for the diversity of
the human animal. The defense and prctection of multiple minority
national identities was Lemkin's original objective.

27.
Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court, supra note 9, art 24 (Sixth)
(providing that "[t]he Criminal Court may order the forfeiture of proceeds, property or
assets derived directly or indirectly from a crime, without prejudice to the rights of the
bona fide third parties").
28.
LEMKIN, supra note 24, at 79.
29.
Id.
30.
Anfal Closing Argument, supra note 3, at 3.
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From my personal observations, I believe that the Iraqi jurists
trying Anfal felt the moral weight of their duty as well as its legal
import. They felt a keen sense of obligation to Iraqi society as a
whole, and the larger pattern of civilized interactions across society.
The Trial Chamber took a major step in sustaining a unified and
whole Iraqi identity with the convictions in this case. When it
becomes publicly available, I should not be in the least surprised to
find that the language of the opinion is laced with the moral outrage
and indignation needed to lend color to merely technical, textbook
descriptions of crime. The Anfal genocide was directed at the very
essence of a people. The Kurds felt its force, and the Judgment
should document the societal and personal effects even as it
documents its legal conclusions.
The Anfal trial also documented another important, but often
neglected, aspect of this field. Lemkin's original text is largely a
compendium of descriptions of the administrative and legal rules
whereby Germany administered the various states and territories
that it occupied all over Europe, together with a 400-page appendix of
translations of those legal rules. Genocide, it seemed to Lemkin,
originated in law. Students of the history of Germany have long
known that the so-called NS-Unrechtsstaat ("National Socialist State
of Injustice") was really a welter of the formalisms of administrative
and regulatory law. One need not enter the argument about the role
of legal positivism in solidifying support for National Socialist rule to
observe that bureaucratic administration of vast conquered
territories, as well as of organized industrial mass murder, requires
regularity and rules, classifications and categories; and law and
lawyers are inevitably implicated in such processes.
Rather than representing an aberrational imposition of
lawlessness, the most chilling and deliberative genocide is that which
is perpetrated pursuant to law. The precise documentation of the
machinery for conceiving and implementing genocide will be one of
the major contributions of the Anfal Trial Judgment. In the Iraqi
experience, the specific legal and policy authority of these defendants
in the Northern Bureau derived from Revolutionary Command
Council Decree Number 160. Saddam issued Decree Number 160 on
March 29, 1987. Decree Number 160 gave Chemical Ali the powers
comparable to the President himself when operating in Northern
Iraq. The official position conveyed by Decree 160 to Ali Hassan alMajid was termed the "Secretary General of the Northern Bureau,"
with power in the Northern Bureau that could be limited only by
Saddam Hussein himself. There was a direct and unbroken line of
authority from Saddam to Chemical Ali. Decree 160 spelled out that
Ali Hassan Al Majid would serve as Secretary General of the
Northern Bureau to execute the policies of the Ba'ath Party and the
Revolutionary Command Council. Along with other evidence, this
language from Decree 160 shows that Anfal was carried out with the
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specific intent and planning of regime officials, and that the attacks
directed against civilians and their villages were undertaken based
31
on a specific policy of the regime.
During Anfal, the policy became chillingly clear to the Kurdish
people-they were to be killed, and the land of the Northern Bureau
was to be stripped clear of their villages and their families. Decree
160 specifically gave Ali Hassan A1-Majid full "authority over all the
state's civil, military and security apparatuses." 32 Just as the line of
authority from Saddam to Chemical Ali was direct and clear, so too
Ali's authority and responsibility was unchallenged over the conduct
of all the Ba'ath party officials, the Military Intelligence Directorate
[Istikhbarat] Iraqi Intelligence Service [Mukhabarat], Internal
Security Service, Commanders of the Popular Army, and all local
political officials in the Northern Bureau.
Because the military
consistently bombed villages in the Northern Bureau and attacked
civilians in hundreds of villages, it is especially important to note that
Decree 160 specifically said that all military commanders in the
Northern Bureau must abide by the commands given by Ali Hassan
33
Al-Majid.
Barely two weeks after receiving the power from Saddam in
Decree 160, regime forces in the Northern Bureau launched the
attacks on the villagers of Sheik Wasan and Balisan. The testimony
is clear about what happened in those villages during the evening
hours of April 16, 1987. These attacks took place eleven months
before Halabja, and were the early phases of the full Anfal campaign.
The villagers heard about a dozen aircraft fly overhead; then,
sometime later, over thirty Iraqi military helicopters flew overhead
and the villagers heard muffled explosions. The effects of this attack
became evident very soon. Apart from the chemical burns, people
were blinded by the fog. Faces turned black and some people
vomited, while almost every survivor of the initial assault
experienced painful swelling. Victims experienced thick yellow goo
that came from their noses and eyes. Doctors in Irbil were able to
treat a very few of the villagers before a local Ba'ath official came and
ordered all treatment to cease. The doctors found that the chemicals
had dried out their eyes and glued them closed. According to the file,
the Ba'ath official forcibly took the patients away from the civilian
hospital on the pretext that they were being transferred to the

31.
See Robert G. Rabil, Operation "Termination of Traitors"'The IraqiRegime
through Its Documents, 6 MIDDLE E. REv. OF INT'L AFF. 3, 19-20 (2002), available at
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue3/rabil.pdf; Human Rights Watch, Genocide in
Iraq: The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds, chapter 2, http://hrw.org/reports/
1993/iraqanfalANFAL2.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
32.
Human Rights Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign against the
Kurds, Appendix, Document 13, p. 1, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/iraq/
APPENDIX.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2007) (reproducing Decree 160).
33.
See id.
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military hospital. When doctors later called the military hospital to
ask about the welfare of their patients, they were told that no
patients had been transferred. Some of those who had been receiving
medical treatment were taken to the Amn jail where many later died
34
as the result of untreated injuries.
Other villagers were very fortunate. Though Anfal showed that
those who participated in the cruelty of the Northern Bureau
campaign could commit terrible cruelty, it also allowed the best of
some people to shine through. Even in the early stages, the planning
and systematic implementation of the Northern Bureau was evident
to those who lived in the areas affected by Anfal. Some of the
villagers who were taken to another hospital were warned by the
medical staff that Security Forces would come to take them away.
The medical staff took the civilian victims home to feed and care for
them until it was safe to provide additional medical care in the
hospital.
So tonight we stand in the near-term shadow of the lengthy trial
and its decision, which has not even been read publicly as I speak
tonight. The defendants tried to reduce Anfal to a military strategythey tried to minimize its implications as nothing more than
dedicated bureaucrats striving to protect the sovereign entity of Iraq.
The Anfal genocide ultimately was based on race, religion, ethnicity,
and culture. That is the truth, but it is not the whole truth. More
than anything, this genocide was about power and greed. It was
about the megalomania of leaders who would brook no challenge to
their authority. It was about the Ba'athist regime headed by Saddam
Hussein that concealed a deep insecurity beneath the bluster and
threats and unbridled cruelty. The regime could tolerate no corner of
Iraq where its will was thwarted. This was genocide in its classic
sense, and it is a testimony to the spirit of a people that the Kurdish
identity survives to represent one of the most promising aspects of
the rebirth of a revitalized Iraqi entity.
The West did not intervene inside Iraq to prevent the Anfal
genocide. The trial itself has served as a window into the experiences
of the Iraqi people under Ba'athist rule. Looking back at the record of
the trial as its final scenes play out over the coming months, the
jurisprudential value of the legal proceeding will merely add to the
larger constellation of case law. Having heard these testimonies,
however, our moral outrage and indignation are exponential.
Henceforth, we will be able to look to the Judgment and to the
televised proceedings as the definitive moment when the societal
silence about Anfal was forever shattered. We add our voices to those
who testified at trial and those whose presence was felt from the

34.
attacks).

See generally Anfal Closing Argument, supra note 3, at 16 (describing the
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mass graves. In our condemnation and commemoration of genocide,
we concur with a great cloud of witnesses: from the merciless ovens of
Auschwitz, they declare "schuldig;" from the hill country of Bosnia,
"krivje;" from the bloody riverbeds of Rwanda, "coupable;" and from
the arid deserts of Darfur, "musnib." From the courtroom in
Baghdad, they call the defendants by their earned names: Saddam
and his co-defendants were genocidaires-"Mufsiduun", evil doers,
sinners.3 5 They committed the crime of crimes. That pronouncement
will echo through the region and be memorialized in the
jurisprudence of the world as one of its hallmarks.
Thank you for your time and attention.

35.
See Jim Guirard, Three Mini Glossaries to Fellow Word Warriors
(Updated), definition of "mufsiduun,"
http://www.truespeak.org/content.php?id
=threeminiglossariesupdated (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).

